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opinion it is said: “The authorities are numerous to the effect that when statutes prohibit or command an act to be done without qualification, in such cases Ignorance or mistake of fact will not excuse their violation. This is peculiarly the case in regard to statutes respecting revenue and police matters, for the mere violation of which, irrespective of the motives or knowledge of the party, certain penalties are enacted; for the law in these cases seems to bind the party to know the facts and to obey the law at his peril. Many of the cases sustaining this view will be found annotated In a note to Farrell v. State,  Ohio St. ,  Am. Rep. , and the result there deduced from the cases Is stated thus: ‘First When to an offense knowledge of certain facts Is essential, then Ignorance of these facts is a defense. Second. When a statute makes an act Indictable, Irrespective of guilty knowledge, then ignorance of fact is no defense.’I deem It unnecessary to express any opinion as to the weight of authority on this subject in other states, because I consider the law of the case at bar plain under our statutes and the former rulings of this court.” Further on the opinion, quoting from State v. Cain,  W. Va. , says: “‘As to whether the seller Intended to violate the law or not at the time of selling to the minor Is, under the authorities cited, Immaterial, except in mitigation of the punishment’ ” And in reference to offenses of a different character and the decisions of other states this further quotation is made: “‘It is true that with us in felonies, and most cases of misdemeanor under the common law, intent Is regarded as being one of the chief elements necessary to constitute the crime or offense, but under this statute the commission of the act prohibited constitutes the offense. This is manifest, I think, from the legislation to which I have referred. I am aware that the highest courts of several of the states have differed In the construction of similar legislation. Some of them have taken the view I have presented, and others a different view. But I apprehend, if the courts of the states adopting a different view from that I have taken had considered their legislation such as required them to construe the legislation as remedial and not penal, they .would have arrived at the same conclusion I have felt myself bound to adopt in this case.’”In the case from which we have just made quotations, as in the case at bar, It was not questioned that the liquor sold was the property of the defendant, that the clerk who sold It was the agent of the defendant, and as such authorized to sell the liquor according to law; nor is it pretended that the defendant did not get the money paid for the liquor. It is true that the statute under consideration in State v. Denoon, supra, contained the language “by one person for another,” but nevertheless the opinion says that “by the positive command of the statute both the clerk and the defendant are guilty of the offense, and they may be Indicted and punished either jointly or separately. It is wholly immaterial, under the positive prohibition and policy of the statute, what the instructions were from the defendant to his clerk, or that the sale was in violation of his instructions. Neither the motives nor the Intent of the defendant, nor his purpose to obey the law, can relieve him, when it is shown that a sale in violation of the statute was actually and purposely made either by himself or by another for him. The clerk knew he was selling the liquor, and the proof shows that he was selling It as the agent of and for the defendant. If the purpose had been to sell a wholly different thing from that which was In fact sold, an article the sale of which was not prohibited, then the motive and Intent might be material. ” A number of authorities are cited In that case for the view taken by the court, among which are  Whart. Crim. Law, § ; Commonwealth v. Kelly,  Mass. ,  N. E. ; Dudley v. Sautblne,  Iowa. ,  Am. Rep. G; People v. Blake,  Mich. G,  N. W. .